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Privacy, Free Speech and Ruthlessness: The Australian Law Reform Commission’s Report, 
Serious Invasions of Privacy in the Digital Era 
 
 
Thomas D C Bennett* 
 
 
 
The scrutiny, revision and development of legal protections for privacy-related interests have 
been proceeding apace in recent years across the common law world. In the UK, the common 
law has embraced a new legal wrong known as ‘misuse of private information’.1 One 
Canadian province has recently added a new ‘intrusion’ tort to its existing privacy 
protections,2 and New Zealand has followed suit with a virtually identical doctrine.3 We 
might see in these developments a growing recognition of the importance of protecting the 
amorphous ‘right to privacy’ from these two types of violation in particular. Whilst the USA 
has long recognised four distinct privacy torts, other common law nations have, until 
recently, shown limited enthusiasm for embracing those categories of tortious privacy 
violation.4 Yet we have seen a rapid acceleration in this field during the last decade. 
Moreover, it is plain that sensitivity to the importance of freedom of speech is an important 
theme within these developments. It is against this background of increased (if still somewhat 
cautious) recognition of privacy as a field ripe (and perhaps overdue) for legal innovation that 
we ought to approach scrutiny of the Australian Law Reform Commission’s (ALRC) recent 
report, Serious Invasions of Privacy in the Digital Era.5 
 
Protection under the common law for privacy interests in Australia is currently patchy. Much 
like pre-Campbell English law, equitable confidentiality provides one, limited route of 
redress for certain informational privacy violations. The High Court case of Lenah Game 
Meats Pty Ltd v Australian Broadcasting Corp left open the possibility for the recognition of 
                                                          
* Newcastle Law School. I am grateful to Richard Mullender for a useful discussion on the themes of this 
comment and to Wenying Li for her helpful comments on an earlier draft. 
1 Campbell v Mirror Group Newspapers Ltd [2004] UKHL 22, [2004] 2 AC 457 
2 Jones v Tsige 2012 ONCA 32, 108 OR (3d) 241 
3 C v Holland [2012] NZHC 2155, [2012] 3 NZLR 672 
4 William Prosser, ‘Privacy’ (1960) 48(3) Cal LR 383; Restatement of the Law (Second): Torts (2d), vol 3 
(American Law Institute 1977) at 376. 
5 Serious Invasions of Privacy in the Digital Era (ALRC Report 123) (hereafter ‘Report’) 
a more general common law right to privacy, but stopped short of confirming it.6 Judicial 
support for developing a common law tort of intrusion has been very limited, though not 
entirely absent. In Grosse v Purvis, an ‘intrusion’ tort was recognised by the Queensland 
District Court.7 However, this decision has not been given the support of the higher courts, 
and the ALRC saw no likelihood that it would be followed in the near future.8 In Kalaba v 
Commonwealth of Australia, the Federal Court declined to follow Grosse, although 
regrettably no detailed reasoning was provided for this decision and the court appeared to rely 
simply on the absence of earlier authority.9 Likewise, although the question of whether an 
intrusion tort ought to be recognised was raised by the Victoria Court of Appeal in Giller v 
Procopets, the Court declined to comment on it, since the claim was amenable to disposition 
on other grounds.10 Moreover, Australia’s traditionally conservative approach to elaborating 
novel tort doctrine weighs in against the likelihood of the judicial development of such a 
cause of action in the near future. Given this rather patchy common law background, the 
apparent desirability of legislative intervention to broaden and clarify the scope of privacy 
protection is understandable.  
 
However, the ALRC report was not commissioned to offer recommendations on whether or 
not Australia ought to legislate to improve legal protections for privacy interests. Indeed, 
three previous reports had already answered that question in the affirmative, including one by 
the ALRC itself.11 Rather the ALRC’s remit in this report was to recommend the form that 
such legislation, should it be enacted, ought to take. The report thus provided the 
Commission with an opportunity to consider in detail questions of tort design, and in 
particular how an ‘ideal’ privacy-protecting framework might look. Of particular concern was 
how to strike the appropriate balance between privacy interests and countervailing concerns, 
most notably freedom of expression. It is upon this issue that the major part of this comment 
                                                          
6 [2001] HCA 63, (2001) 185 ALR 1 
7 [2003] QDC 151 
8 Report (n 5) para 3.56. A decision similar to Grosse was made by the Victoria County Court in Jane Doe v 
Australian Broadcasting Corporation [2007] VCC 281. In that case, in which the defendant had broadcast the 
identity of a rape victim in breach of a statutory prohibition, a County Court judge held that, following Lenah (n 
6), a tort of invasion of privacy existed in Australia. However, since the case was amenable to disposal on other 
grounds, this aspect of the judgment was arguably obiter. Moreover, it was a first-instance decision and the 
appeal was settled before an appellate court could weigh in. 
9 [2004] FCA 763 
10 [2008] VSCA 236, (2008) 79 IPR 489 
11 See Victorian Law Reform Commission, Surveillance in Public Places, Report 18 (2010); NSW Law Reform 
Commission, Invasion of Privacy, Report 120 (2009); For Your Information: Australian Privacy Law and 
Practice (ALRC Report 108). 
focuses. For upon scrutiny, it becomes clear that the Commission’s proposals strongly 
prioritise the protection of free expression over individual privacy.  
 
Whilst the judiciaries in other parts of the common law world (such as England, Canada and 
New Zealand) have given attention to this balance in the course of decisions to elaborate the 
law, those courts clearly did not have the opportunity to engage in the level of detailed 
consideration of how to design such a rights-balancing framework that the Commission was 
afforded. Its conclusions are the result of lengthy consideration and flow from the receipt of 
substantial amounts of evidence. They are therefore of considerable significance, irrespective 
of whether or not they are ever  adopted as the basis for a new statutory tort in Australia. 
 
THE REPORT’S MAIN RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
At the outset, it is worth taking the opportunity to summarise the main recommendations 
from the ALRC’s report. First and foremost, it recommends that a new, statutory privacy tort 
ought to be enacted in a Commonwealth Act (that is, an Act of general application across 
Australia). It recommends the creation of a single tort of ‘invasion of privacy’. Liability 
under this tort may arise as the result of the commission of either of two tortious wrongs: 
‘intrusion upon seclusion’ or ‘misuse of private information’.12 The two proposed heads of 
‘invasion of privacy’ have distinct elements. Nevertheless, the Commission preferred a single 
tort with two ‘sub-categories’ of liability rather than two distinct torts.13 The tort is thus 
designed to adopt the same elements for both sub-categories so far as possible. 
  
The tort proposed by the ALRC includes a threshold test of ‘seriousness’, which the plaintiff 
must satisfy in order for a claim to be actionable.14 Moreover, the plaintiff bears the onus of 
proving from the outset that the public interest in her privacy claim outweighs any 
countervailing public interest (for instance, in freedom of expression).15 The Report 
recommends that the defendant bear the burden of adducing evidence of countervailing 
public interest considerations, but that the ‘onus’ remains on the plaintiff  to satisfy the court 
that the public interest in privacy prevails over them. 
                                                          
12 The Report (Recommendation 5-2) recommends that for the purposes of misuse of private information claims, 
‘information’ includes untrue, as well as true, information ‘but only if the information would be private if it 
were true’ (at p 83). 
13 Report (n 5) para 5.80 
14 Report (n 5) ch 9 
15 Report (n 5) para 9.6 
 In order to found a claim, the plaintiff must prove: 
 
 a) either an intrusion upon seclusion or a misuse of private information;16 
 b) that she had a reasonable expectation of privacy in all the circumstances;17 
 c) that the invasion was ‘serious’;18 
d) that the public interest in her privacy outweighs any countervailing public 
interests.19 
 
Despite opposition from a number of stakeholders, the ALRC made plain its belief that ‘a 
discrete seriousness threshold, in addition to the public interest balancing test’, was 
desirable.20 This was, it said, to ‘further ensure the new tort does not unduly burden 
competing interests such as freedom of speech’.21 The ALRC also recommended that the tort 
must have been committed either intentionally or recklessly; negligence would not suffice.22 
The tort would be actionable per se, and provision would be made for damages to be awarded 
for emotional distress.23 Other recommendations concerning remedies, procedure and access 
to justice, feature in the report but will not be considered in detail here; we will focus on the 
basic framework proposed for the invasion tort itself.24 
 
We can see that the design of the proposed tort takes on the familiar shape of a multi-factorial 
balancing exercise. This is a common method to adopt not just in privacy torts but in many 
other heads of tort liability,25 for it provides a mechanism by which the judiciary can engage 
                                                          
16 Report (n 5) ch 5 
17 Report (n 5) ch 6 
18 Report (n 5) ch 8 
19 Report (n 5) ch 9 
20 Report (n 5) para 8.15 
21 Report (n 5) para 8.15 
22 Report (n 5) ch 7 
23 Report (n 5) ch 8 
24 These can be found in the Report (n 5) at chs 10, 12 and 16. Of these, the most notable is the recommendation 
to include apology orders and correction orders within the remedial framework available to successful plaintiffs, 
which features in ch 12. 
25 Australian courts are particularly experienced in dealing with this sort of exercise, since something similar 
arises under the test used in Australia to determine the existence of duties of care in negligence, although the 
ALRC’s proposed formulation is significantly more tightly structured. This duty test is the ‘salient features’ 
approach outlined in Sullivan v Moody [2001] 183 ALR 404 which incorporates reference to both doctrine and 
policy considerations. Indeed the ‘salient features’ test eschews the more rigidly structured guidance issued by 
the House of Lords in Caparo Industries Plc v Dickman [1989] QB 653, 703 per Lord Bingham, suggesting a 
particular keenness to ensure all relevant factors are considered. (See further n 51.) 
with a pervasive difficulty: the problem of incommensurability.26 Many tort claims fall 
against a backdrop of ‘competitive pluralism’,27 in which multiple significant interests (for 
instance, personal security and freedom of action) each provide compelling but ‘incompatible 
grounds on which to respond to the same practical problem’.28 The background to privacy 
claims is likewise often one featuring competing, valuable but incommensurable interests. 
But in privacy cases, two oft-competing interests tend to evoke particularly strong moral and 
political sentiments: personal privacy and freedom of speech. Whilst each of these interests 
are of considerable value (whether on a deontological or utilitarian calculus), it is difficult (if 
not impossible) to rank them relative to one another in the absence of a common metric. 
Having pointed up this difficulty, we will now outline some comparable judicial methods for 
engaging with the privacy-free speech conflict. Upon examination of these, it is clear that, 
whilst the Commission took cognisance of them, it preferred a very different approach. We 
will at that point be in a position to scrutinise the way in which the ALRC proposes to deal 
with this issue of incommensurability. 
 
‘BALANCING’ PRIVACY AND FREE SPEECH 
 
The ALRC, in deciding to adopt a framework that talks of balancing (but which in fact 
prioritises free expression) took account of privacy tort models from across the common law 
world.29 The English tort of ‘misuse of private information’ (MPI), recognised by the House 
of Lords in Campbell v MGN,30 is a clear source of guidance for the Commission, which has 
gone so far as to adopt the English nomenclature for the first of its actionable types of 
‘invasion of privacy’. However, the ALRC does not adopt a key feature of MPI – the 
‘ultimate balancing test’ employed by the English courts.31 In England, the courts set out to 
strike a ‘balance’ between the Article 8 (ECHR) right to private life and the Article 10 right 
to freedom of expression using this method. Under this approach, in which ‘neither article has 
as such precedence over the other,’32 the courts engage in a fact-sensitive analysis of the 
particular circumstances of the case.33 At a formal level, then, the English MPI tort does not 
                                                          
26 Joseph Raz, The Morality of Freedom (Oxford University Press 1986) 329 
27 ibid 404 
28 Richard Mullender, ‘English Negligence Law as a Human Practice’ (2009) 21(3) Law & Literature 321, 328 
29 Report (n 5) ch 1.24-1.31 
30 Campbell (n 1) 
31 Re S (A Child) [2004] UKHL 47, [2005] 1 AC 593, [17] 
32 ibid (emphasis is original) 
33 Mosley v News Group Newspapers Ltd [2008] EWHC 1777 (QB), [2008] EMLR 20, [10] 
accord presumptive priority to either interest, but instead relies on ‘weighing the relevant 
competing … rights [of the parties] in the light of an “intense focus” upon the individual facts 
of the case.’34 
 
In New Zealand, a private facts tort was recognised by the Court of Appeal in Hosking v 
Runting.35 Whilst the New Zealand court preferred openly to label the action a tort of 
privacy, demurring from the UK terminology which was (then) couched in the language of 
equitable confidentiality, the action is very similar to its English counterpart.36 The Court of 
Appeal made clear that a defence of legitimizing publication of privacy facts must exist 
where there is ‘legitimate public concern in the information’.37 But like the English courts, 
the Court of Appeal rejected the notion that the plaintiff should be burdened with the task of 
proving that there was no applicable defence: 
 
[I]t is more conceptually sound for this to constitute a defence, particularly 
given the parallels with breach of confidence claims, where public interest is 
an established defence. Moreover, it would be for the defendant to provide 
the evidence of the concern, which is the appropriate burden of proof if the 
plaintiff has shown that there has been an interference with his or her privacy 
…38  
 
In instances of intrusion, it seems that the potential for conflict between privacy and free 
speech interests is less pronounced than in cases of wrongful publication of private 
information. However, the potential for such a conflict is clearly recognised as real and has 
been proactively attended to. In the 2012 case of Jones v Tsige, the Ontario Court of Appeal 
became the first court in Canada to recognise a distinct tort of ‘intrusion upon seclusion’ at 
common law.39 Sharpe JA set out the tort’s elements in the following way: 
 
[F]irst ... the defendant’s conduct must be intentional [or reckless]; second, ... 
the defendant must have invaded, without lawful justification, the plaintiff’s 
                                                          
34 ibid 
35 [2004] NZCA 34, [2005] 1 NZLR 1 
36 ibid [247] 
37 ibid [129] 
38 ibid 
39 Jones (n 2) 
private affairs or concerns; and third, ... a reasonable person would regard the 
invasion as highly offensive causing distress, humiliation or anguish.40 
 
In elucidating the elements of this tort, Sharpe JA was acutely aware of its potential to 
conflict with freedom of speech. He made plain that, in instances of conflict between these 
two significant interests, a balance would need to be struck on the particular facts of each 
case:  
 
[N]o right to privacy can be absolute and many claims for the protection of 
privacy will have to be reconciled with, and even yield to, such competing 
claims.41 
 
Likewise, when the New Zealand High Court followed suit just eight months after Jones, 
recognising a novel ‘intrusion upon seclusion’ tort (in very similar terms), Whata J was 
attentive to the need to balance both privacy and free speech interests:42 
 
A right of action only arises in respect of an intrusion that is objectively 
determined, due to its extent and nature, to be offensive by causing real hurt 
or harm. A legitimate public concern in the information may provide a 
defence to the privacy claim.43 
 
The incorporation of a defence for conduct benefiting the public interest is consonant with the 
earlier ruling in Hosking, and it is clear that, in Holland, Whata J regarded the recognition of 
an intrusion tort as an incremental extension of the principles expounded in Hosking.44 
 
Three comparable common law jurisdictions have, then, recently adopted methodologies that 
endeavour to accommodate both the interests of privacy and free speech without expressly 
according either presumptive priority. The ALRC’s proposed tort, however, bucks this trend 
and accords formal, methodological priority to freedom of expression.  
 
                                                          
40 ibid [71] 
41 ibid [73] 
42 Holland (n 3) 
43 ibid [96] 
44 ibid [86] 
INCOMMENSURABILITY, ‘BALANCING’ AND RUTHLESSNESS 
 
When one strips away much of the rhetoric surrounding its basic elements, the proposed tort 
plainly tilts the scales ‘in favour of free expression and other public interests’.45 The  ALRC 
admits as much, though in stating that the scales are tilted only ‘slightly’ towards free 
expression, it downplays the extent of the imbalance. In each of the elements that the plaintiff 
must prove, countervailing free speech (and other) interests are brought to the foreground, 
either explicitly or by implication.  
 
Given the incommensurability of these interests, it quickly becomes apparent that, from the 
litigants’ perspective, balance is not achievable. For the sphere of tort litigation is 
traditionally the arena of bilateral disputes in which the courts are the arbiters.46 One interest 
must ultimately triumph over the other; courts do not have the luxury of being able to hold 
the interests in perfect equilibrium. Given this, there are three options facing a decision-
maker (either a common law judge or the designer of legislation). Presumptive priority can be 
accorded to either the privacy or the free expression interest. Alternatively, a ‘balancing’ 
method can start from the basis that the interests are presumptively of equal importance and 
move to engage in highly fact-sensitive adjudication, which will lead to disposal of each 
matter on a case-by-case basis and avoid laying down sweeping rules of general application. 
 
Because of the need ultimately to choose to protect one interest or the other in any given case, 
talk of ‘balancing’ in the litigation sphere is problematic. The work of philosopher and 
political theorist Isaiah Berlin can assist us in reframing the issue; rather than seeking to 
balance interests which cannot be ranked on a common scale, decision-makers tasked with 
choosing between them ought to seek to take each interest sufficiently seriously.47 As 
Mullender puts it, ‘societies can respond to the problems thrown up by … 
incommensurability by accommodating the relevant values in ways that give expression to 
“the general pattern of life” in which their members believe.’48 We might thus attribute to the 
term ‘balancing’ a particular meaning in the context of approaching privacy cases. The term 
ought to be used to describe a method for disposing of cases involving conflicting rights in a 
                                                          
45 Report (n 5) para 9.31 
46 Ernest J Weinrib, ‘Understanding Tort Law’ (1989) 23 Valparaiso University Law Review 485, 494 
47 Isaiah Berlin, ‘The Pursuit of the Ideal’ in The Crooked Timber of Humanity: Chapters in the History of Ideas 
(Pimlico 2003). 
48 Richard Mullender, ‘Human Rights, Responsibilities and the Pursuit of a Realistic Utopia’ (2010) 61(1) NILQ 
33, 47, citing Isaiah Berlin, Four Essays on Liberty (Oxford University Press 1969) lv. 
manner which shows sufficient sensitivity to the importance of each, such that the decision-
maker can be seen to take both rights seriously. 
 
The ‘onus’ on the plaintiff 
 
The presumptive imbalance (i.e. the tilting towards free expression) in the proposed tort was 
raised in submissions to the ALRC. One scholar suggested that a plaintiff may actually need 
to prove at three different points in the course of making out her claim that her privacy 
interest was sufficiently serious to outweigh countervailing concerns.49 It is regrettable that, 
whilst noting this submission, the Commission did not directly address it. Rather than 
brushing the issue aside, one response the ALRC could have offered would have been to 
highlight the considerable experience that the courts have in dealing with this sort of multi-
factorial balancing exercise in tort law. Instead of actually considering the seriousness of the 
plaintiff’s claim in triplicate, the courts might well adopt a less rigidly structured approach, 
embracing the entirety of the plaintiff’s arguments on the weight to be accorded to her claim 
in a single, all-encompassing assessment. For whilst the formal elements of tortious causes of 
action often overlap, the courts tend not to get bogged down by them.50 This is especially true 
in Australia, where the use of the ‘salient features’ approach resolves duty questions in 
negligence.51  
 
This might have led the ALRC to clarify that, in apparently setting up three points where the 
balance between the plaintiff’s rights and the public interest may be considered, the proposed 
tort is simply giving the courts discretion as to the manner in which they conduct that test. 
The Commission might further have indicated that the design of the tort aims to keep the 
importance of free expression at the forefront of judges’ minds throughout the decision-
making process. However, the ARLC did not see fit to respond directly to this criticism and 
                                                          
49 Paul Wragg, Submission to ALRC (Submission 73), para 3.3 
50 See, in the English context, Caparo (n 25). C.f. James McNaughton Paper Group Ltd v Hicks Anderson & Co 
[1991] 2 QB 113, 123-4 per Neill LJ. 
51 This ‘salient features’ approach was developed as a tool to ensure incremental development of the Australian 
common law, and reflected a rejection of the tests adopted in the English cases of in Anns v Merton LBC [1978] 
AC 728, [1977] 2 WLR 1024, and Caparo (n 25). It eschews the more rigid structure of the two- and three-stage 
tests (in Anns and Caparo, respectively) and instead requires the court to undertake ‘... a close analysis of the 
facts bearing on the relationship between the plaintiff and the ... tortfeasor’, Caltex Refineries (Qld) Pty Limited 
v Stavar [2009] NSWCA 258, (2990) 75 NSWLR 649, [102] per Allsop P. The test has its roots in the case of 
Graham Barclay Oysters Pty Ltd v Ryan [2002] HCA 54, 211 CLR 540, 194 ALR 337, and contains a non-
exhaustive list of ‘salient features’ which the court may take into account. These factors are set out usefully in 
Caltex at [103]. 
so we are left without a clear idea of the Commission’s view as to how the courts will deal 
with it. 
 
The bigger problem here, however, is not how many times the plaintiff might be required to 
prove that the balance ought to come down in favour of her privacy. It is rather that she is 
required to prove this at all. For the ALRC could have instead placed the onus either on the 
defendant to prove that a pressing public interest outweighed the plaintiff’s right to privacy, 
or, alternatively, it could have left it to the court to identify any public interest considerations 
(as is the English approach under the Re S guidance).52  
 
In its proposed formulation, the ALRC’s privacy tort prioritises one particular socially 
beneficial goal, the protection of free expression in the public interest from subjugation to the 
privacy claims of individuals. In so doing, the tort lays groundwork for the courts to pay more 
attention to these free speech interests than individuals’ privacy claims. Indeed it may be that 
very little attention is given to individuals’ privacy other than in ‘obvious’ cases. For Berlin, 
this would not be an adequate response to the problem of incommensurability. Whilst it is 
inevitable in a world of incommensurable interests that hard choices will need to be made 
between them, an adequate response would see ‘none of the relevant factors … ignored.’53 
Yet that is precisely what is at stake for individual privacy under the proposed tort.  
 
The design calls to mind Thomas Nagel’s concept of ‘ruthlessness’.54 According to Nagel, 
those concerned with ‘public morality’ (as distinct from the ‘private morality’ which leads to 
a greater concern with individuals’ interests), place emphasis on securing publicly beneficial 
outcomes. They exhibit ‘ruthlessness’ when they are inattentive (or less attentive) to the 
interests of minorities in pursuit of these goals. In cases involving freedom of speech, and 
particularly that of the media, instances of ruthlessness are not uncommon. Indeed, Richard 
Mullender has identified ruthlessness as a doctrinal theme in public interest defences to 
defamation across the common law world.55 It is apparent, for example, in the USA’s 
Sullivan rule which virtually extinguishes the chances of bringing successful libel claims for 
                                                          
52 Re S (n 31) 
53 Berlin, ‘The Pursuit of the Ideal’ (n 47) 19 
54 Thomas Nagel, Mortal Questions (Cambridge University Press 1979) ch 6 
55 Richard Mullender, ‘Defamation and Responsible Communication’ (2010) 126 LQR 368 
an entire class of claimants.56 Given that the ALRC’s proposed tort is yet more restrictive 
than Sullivan, there can be little doubt that it is ‘ruthless’ in much the same way.57  
 
Privacy as ‘public interest’ 
 
A related but distinct concern about the ALRC’s proposed formulation is that the ‘balance’ it 
aims to strike between the two incommensurable interests of privacy and free expression 
actually purports (troublingly) to identify a common metric by which they may be ranked. 
This is a matter upon which the Commission changed tack between its Discussion Paper and 
the Report: 
 
In the Discussion Paper, the ALRC proposed that a court should be satisfied 
that ‘the plaintiff’s interest in privacy outweighs the defendant’s interest in 
freedom of expression and any broader public interest’. However, the ALRC 
now recommends that the focus be on balancing the public interest in privacy 
with any countervailing public interests.58  
 
It explained its decision thus: 
 
Privacy is not merely a private interest, but also an important public interest. 
The private interests of the parties, such as in privacy or free expression, will 
generally reflect the broader public interests at stake.59  
 
Consequently, the plaintiff must ‘satisfy the court that the public interest in privacy 
outweighs any countervailing public interest that is raised in the proceedings.’60 The ALRC 
is asserting here that both sides of the argument may be measured in terms of their respective 
‘public interest’ value. In other words, they are not incommensurable. As such, the ALRC’s 
                                                          
56 New York Times v Sullivan 376 US 254 (1964). Under Sullivan, a plaintiff who is a public figure must 
demonstrate ‘actual malice’ (that is, actual knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard for the truth) on the part of 
the defendant. If he fails to do so, his claim will not be actionable. 
57 See n 75 and accompanying text. 
58 Report (n 5) para 9.72 (emphasis is original) 
59 ibid 
60 Report (n 5) p 158, (Recommendation 9-3) (emphasis added). See also ch 2. 
formulation downplays the extent to which these interests may inherently conflict with one 
another.61 
 
The ALRC takes its cue on this from the judgment of Lord Goff in Spycatcher, wherein he 
stated that: 
 
although the basis of the law’s protection of confidence is that there is a 
public interest that confidences should be preserved and protected by the law, 
nevertheless that public interest may be outweighed by some other 
countervailing public interest which favours disclosure.62 
 
However, it takes a significant leap to translate Lord Goff’s dicta on this point into a general 
rule for application in cases of individual privacy. First, Spycatcher concerned the law of 
confidentiality, not a law of privacy as such. Although equitable confidentiality had the 
ability indirectly to protect privacy, and had been mobilised by imaginative counsel to that 
end on occasion,63 its main focus had always been on the ‘public interest’ in ensuring 
relationships of confidence were maintained. Second, in Spycatcher itself, a particular type of 
confidential information was in issue – state secrets relating to matters of national security. 
There was no individual privacy interest at stake, and indeed the entirety of the interest in 
maintaining the ‘confidentiality’ of the material derived from the public interest in preserving 
official secrets. The ALRC’s use of Spycatcher stretches the ruling far beyond its own factual 
and legal matrix, and thus appears at best ill-considered, and at worst rather disingenuous. 
 
This aspect of the Commission’s proposal is also troubling for two further reasons. First, the 
ALRC’s formulation further tilts the scales in favour of free expression at an evidential level. 
The public interest value of free expression is something that media defendants, in particular, 
are well-versed in evidencing. It is relatively straightforward to evidence at least some degree 
of public interest in free speech, for example by demonstrating its relevance to debate of 
general public importance. But it is more difficult to fathom what evidence would be needed 
to show that an individual’s privacy has sufficient public value to outweigh freedom of 
expression. On this issue the Report provides no assistance. For not only does it not elaborate 
                                                          
61 Berlin, Four Essays on Liberty (n 48) lvi: ‘One freedom may abort another; one freedom may obstruct or fail 
to create conditions which make other freedoms … possible …’ 
62 Attorney General v Observer Ltd (No.2) (Spycatcher) [1988] UKHL 6, [1990] 1 AC 109, 282 
63 For example, Prince Albert v Strange (1849) 2 De Gex & Smale 652; Stephens v Avery [1988] FSR 510. 
what factors might be relevant to determining the weight of the privacy interest, it also fails 
to indicate how to determine the relative value of the particular expression. The ALRC 
merely states that there are likely to be cases where the ‘public interest’ in the plaintiff’s 
privacy is ‘obvious’, but in other cases evidence will need to be adduced.64  
 
Second, whilst it is quite correct to say that individual privacy has a public interest element,65 
its private elements ought not to be denied. The plaintiff’s interest is clearly not simply a 
public one (in the sense of invoking what Nagel would term ‘public morality’).66 It is also 
(perhaps primarily) an individualistic, private interest in personal integrity (and relates 
broadly to Nagel’s concept of ‘private morality’).67 Whilst the ALRC recognises the 
individualistic, private aspect of privacy,68 the proposed formulation for the tort excludes this 
from the test of seriousness. The competing interests are painted as commensurable, but only 
because privacy’s individualistic aspects are literally removed from the equation. 
 
The ALRC’s formulation invites the courts to overlook entirely the private interests in the 
plaintiff’s claim and to accord it weight only in so far as it promotes some broader public 
interest. So much is clear from its assertion that ‘the private interests of the parties … will 
generally reflect the broader public interests at stake’.69 This is a highly utilitarian vision of 
the value of privacy, and it reinforces the argument made above that this proposed tort 
legitimizes ruthlessness. 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
If the Commission’s proposals are enacted, one indirect effect will be to highlight the extent 
to which English privacy law has been overtaken by that of comparable jurisdictions across 
the common law world. It is trite to state that English law has long refused to follow the 
American path of recognising a range of distinct privacy torts, such as the four which feature 
in William Prosser’s taxonomy and, as a result, in the USA’s second restatement of torts. 
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Until recent times, English law has secured protection for informational privacy interests 
which is broadly equivalent to that in jurisdictions such as Canada, New Zealand and 
Australia. Indeed, it might even be argued that in the period of cautious development that 
began immediately following the Human Rights Act 1998 and which culminated in the 
Campbell, Re S and Murray70 rulings on MPI, English law represented the cutting edge in 
protections at common law for informational privacy violations. 
 
This tort of MPI was influential in the recognition of similar, informational torts across the 
common law world.71 But whilst these other jurisdictions might for a while have appeared to 
be playing catch-up, it is increasingly clear that English law is in danger of stagnating. Whilst 
Canada and New Zealand have now joined the USA in recognising a distinct tort of ‘intrusion 
upon seclusion’, English law has been ‘unwilling’ to do so.72 There have been hints at the 
recognition of ‘intrusion’ as a legal wrong, but the courts have stopped short of developing it 
into a full-blown tort in its own right (i.e. distinct from misuse of private information).73 The 
ALRC proposes to add Australia to the list of jurisdictions recognising that tort. In C v 
Holland, Whata J remarked that ‘acceptance [of an intrusion tort] in some parts of North 
America is not an international trend.’74 But with New Zealand and, now, Australia 
(potentially) added to the list, the UK will look more and more like the odd nation out. Faced 
with this rapid about turn (Canada and New Zealand having recognised their ‘intrusion’ torts 
with an unexpected suddenness in 2012), English judges might understandably feel somewhat 
bewildered; their once cutting-edge law has been overtaken by the significantly more 
comprehensive protections of our common law worldly peers. 
 
The attentiveness to the wrong of intrusion (placing of it on a footing equal to misuses of 
private information) is the biggest positive to come out of the ALRC’s report. However, this 
aspect of the proposals is overshadowed by the high hurdle facing plaintiffs in terms of 
establishing their case. The requirement to prove that the claim outweighs all countervailing 
interests is a burdensome workload indeed.  
 
                                                          
70 Murray v Express Newspapers Ltd [2008] EWCA Civ 446, [2009] Ch 481 
71 For instance, in Hosking (n 35). 
72 Wainwright v Home Office [2003] UKHL 53, [2004] 2 AC 406, [18] per Lord Hoffmann 
73 See Goodwin v MGN Ltd [2011] EWHC 1437 (QB), [2011] EMLR 27, [85] per Tugendhat J. In a recent 
essay, Moreham has highlighted this deficiency. See NA Moreham, ‘Beyond Information: Physical Privacy in 
English Law’ (2014) 73(2) CLJ 350. 
74 Holland (n 3) [87] 
In requiring the plaintiff to prove that her claim outweighs any and all relevant public 
interests, the proposed tort goes further even than the highly restrictive Sullivan rule in US 
defamation law.75 The comparison with Sullivan is stark. Whilst Sullivan imposes a high 
evidential burden on a limited class of plaintiffs (public figures), it stops short of requiring 
any plaintiff to prove that her right to reputation outweighs any possible countervailing public 
interest. The ALRC’s proposed privacy tort, however, imposes a burden on all plaintiffs to 
show that their privacy is a more weighty consideration than any other. Moreover, it requires 
a plaintiff seeking to do that to frame her argument in terms of the ‘public interest’. Imposing 
this as the metric by which privacy and free speech interests are judged has a twofold effect. 
First, by adopting ‘public interest’ as the unit of measurement, free speech is inevitably 
privileged. This is because the value of expression is generally judged by reference to its 
‘contribution … to a debate of general interest.’76 Second, it appears to remove from the 
court’s field of vision those aspects of privacy which are valuable as purely private interests 
(such as the plaintiff’s personal security and dignity). 
 
The default position under the ALRC’s proposals is that, absent compelling reasons why a 
privacy claim should succeed, countervailing interests (most obviously in free expression) 
will prevail. The proposed tort’s formulation fundamentally fails to grasp the 
incommensurability of privacy and free speech, and its framework for dealing with both 
interests is inadequate. Notwithstanding that certain aspects of privacy have public interest 
value, much of privacy’s value is individualistic. Those aspects which are individualistic are 
not amenable to being neatly ranked against free speech. And in failing to accommodate 
these individualistic aspects of privacy at all, victims of privacy invasion will rightly feel that 
the proposed tort does not take their interests sufficiently seriously. The ALRC’s clear drive 
to design a tort that is sensitive to free speech has led it to prioritise free expression to a level 
that may be unassailable. To put it in stark, Nagelian terms, the proposed tort’s design 
‘licenses ruthlessness’.77 
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